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OPINION 
        ____________ 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 This is an action for unpaid insurance benefits brought 
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq.  Plaintiff North Jersey 
Brain & Spine Center (“NJBSC”) appeals an order entered by 
the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey 
dismissing its complaint for lack of standing under ERISA.  
The question presented on appeal is whether a patient’s 
explicit assignment of payment of insurance benefits to her 
healthcare provider, without direct reference to the right to 
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file suit, is sufficient to give the provider standing to sue for 
those benefits under ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).  
Because we find that such an assignment does confer 
standing, we will reverse the order of the District Court and 
remand this action for further proceedings. 
 
I. 
 
 NJBSC is a neurosurgical medical practice located in 
Bergen County, New Jersey.  NJBSC treated three patients 
who were members of ERISA-governed healthcare plans 
administered by defendant-appellee Aetna, Inc.  Prior to 
surgery, each patient executed an assignment that read, in 
relevant part:  “I authorize [NJBSC] to appeal to my 
insurance company on my behalf. . . .  I hereby assign to 
[NJBSC] all payments for medical services rendered to 
myself or my dependents.”  Appendix (“App.”) 21.  NJBSC 
reserved the right to bill the patients for any amount not 
covered by their insurance.  Following treatment, Aetna 
allegedly underpaid or refused to pay claims for each of the 
patients.    NJBSC filed suit against Aetna in the New Jersey 
Superior Court for non-payment of benefits pursuant to § 
502(a) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).  Aetna removed the 
case to the United States District Court for the District of 
New Jersey. 
 
 On March 6, 2014, the District Court dismissed 
NJBSC’s complaint, holding that the assigned rights to 
payment did not give NJBSC standing to sue under ERISA.  
The District Court acknowledged, both in its March 6 opinion 
and in its order permitting NJBSC to file this interlocutory 
appeal, that the district was split as to whether an assignment 
of payments was sufficient to confer standing under § 
502(a).1 
                                              
1 Compare Wayne Surgical Ctr., LLC v. Concentra Preferred 
Sys., Inc., No. 06-928, 2007 WL 2416428, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 
20, 2007) (“[I]t is illogical to recognize that . . . a valid 
assignee has a right to receive the benefit of direct 
reimbursement from its patients’ insurers but cannot enforce 
this right.”), with MHA, LLC v. Aetna Health, Inc., No. 12-
2984, 2013 WL 705612, at *7 (D.N.J. Feb. 25, 2013) (“[T]he 
Court respectfully disagrees with the view that there is no 
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II.2 
 This Court exercises plenary review over district court 
orders dismissing a complaint for lack of standing.  Baldwin 
v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 636 F.3d 69, 74 (3d Cir. 
2011).  “[W]hen standing is challenged on the basis of the 
pleadings, we accept as true all material allegations in the 
complaint, and . . . construe the complaint in favor of the 
complaining party.”  FOCUS v. Allegheny Cnty. Court of 
Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 838 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting 
Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 7 (1988) (quotation 
marks omitted)).3 
                                                                                                     
distinction between an assignment of a right to payment and 
an assignment of plan benefits.  It is only the latter that 
creates derivative standing in a provider assignee to sue under 
§ 502.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 
 
2 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1331.  Because the District Court “certifie[d] in writing that 
its order involve[d] ‘a controlling question of law as to which 
there is substantial ground for difference of opinion[,]’” this 
Court has jurisdiction to review NJBSC’s interlocutory 
appeal.  Johnson v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 724 F.3d 
337, 340 n.4, 344-45 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 
1292(b)). 
 
3 The motion to dismiss before the District Court was filed 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  Ordinarily, 
Rule 12(b)(1) governs motions to dismiss for lack of 
standing, as standing is a jurisdictional matter.  But the 
Supreme Court has warned that “when Congress does not 
rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, 
courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in 
character.”  Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 516 
(2006).  Several United States Courts of Appeals have 
therefore treated challenges to a plaintiff’s status as an ERISA 
plan “participant” as nonjurisdictional.  See, e.g., Leeson v. 
Transamerica Disability Income Plan, 671 F.3d 969, 978 (9th 
Cir. 2012); Lanfear v. Home Depot, Inc., 536 F.3d 1217, 
1221 (11th Cir. 2008); Harzewski v. Guidant Corp., 489 F.3d 
799, 803-04 (7th Cir. 2007).  This case deals with a party 
claiming derivative rather than direct status as a participant, 
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III. 
 
 Section 502(a) of ERISA empowers “a participant or 
beneficiary” to bring a civil action “to recover benefits due to 
him under the terms of his plan.”  29 U.S.C. 1132(a). See 
Pascack Valley Hosp. v. Local 464A UFCW Welfare 
Reimbursement Plan, 388 F.3d 393, 400 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(citing 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)).  A “participant” is “any 
employee or former employee of an employer, or any 
member or former member of an employee organization, who 
is or may become eligible to receive a benefit of any type 
from an employee benefit plan which covers employees of 
such employer or members of such organization, or whose 
beneficiaries may be eligible to receive any such benefit.”  29 
U.S.C. § 1002(7).  A “beneficiary” is “a person designated by 
a participant, or by the terms of an employee benefit plan, 
who is or may become entitled to a benefit thereunder.”  Id. § 
1002(8).  Healthcare providers that are neither participants 
nor beneficiaries in their own right may obtain derivative 
standing by assignment from a plan participant or beneficiary.  
CardioNet, Inc. v. Cigna Health Corp., 751 F.3d 165, 176 
n.10 (3d Cir. 2014).   
 
 This case presents the question of what type of 
assignment is necessary to confer derivative standing.  
NJBSC argues that an assignment of the right to payment is 
sufficient.  Aetna, by contrast, urges us to hold that an 
assignment must explicitly include not just the right to 
                                                                                                     
but that does not change the analysis.  Whether NJBSC has 
gained derivative status involves a merits-based 
determination.  This is not a case where an alleged federal 
claim “appears to be immaterial and made solely for the 
purpose of obtaining jurisdiction.”  Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 
678, 682 (1946).  Therefore, the motion to dismiss was 
properly filed under Rule 12(b)(6).  For purposes of our 
review, however, a motion for lack of statutory standing is 
effectively the same whether it comes under Rule 12(b)(1) or 
12(b)(6).  See Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 
77, 83 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Under most circumstances, ‘[a] 
dismissal for lack of statutory standing is effectively the same 
as a dismissal for failure to state a claim.’” (quoting Baldwin, 
636 F.3d at 73). 
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payment but also the patient’s legal claim to that payment if a 
provider is to file suit.4 
 ERISA itself is silent on the issue of derivative 
standing and assignments.  In such situations, “it is well 
settled that Congress intended that the federal courts would 
fill in the gaps by developing, in light of reason, experience, 
and common sense, a federal common law of rights and 
obligations imposed by the statute.”  Teamsters Pension Trust 
Fund of Phila. & Vicinity v. Littlejohn, 155 F.3d 206, 208 (3d 
Cir. 1998); see also Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 
489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989) (“[W]e have held that courts are to 
develop a federal common law of rights and obligations under 
ERISA-regulated plans.” (quotation marks omitted)). 
 
 We hold that as a matter of federal common law, when 
a patient assigns payment of insurance benefits to a healthcare 
provider, that provider gains standing to sue for that payment 
under ERISA § 502(a).  An assignment of the right to 
payment logically entails the right to sue for non-payment.  
See I.V. Servs. of Am., Inc. v. Inn Dev. & Mgmt., Inc., 7 F. 
Supp. 2d 79, 84 (D. Mass. 1998) (“An assignment to receive 
payment of benefits necessarily incorporates the right to seek 
payment. . . . [T]he right to receive benefits would be hollow 
                                              
4 Both NJBSC and Aetna argue that we resolved this issue in 
prior opinions.  Aetna contends that in Community Medical 
Center v. Local 464A UFCW Welfare Reimbursement Plan, 
143 F. App’x 433, 436 (3d Cir. 2005), this Court recognized a 
distinction between an assignment of benefits and an 
assignment of the legal claim to those benefits.  But the 
distinction was made in dicta, and in any case Community 
Medical Center was a non-precedential opinion.  NJBSC 
claims we held in CardioNet that a provider with derivative 
standing may assert “whatever rights the assignor[s] 
possessed.”  751 F.3d at 178.  But that statement applied to 
the CardioNet plaintiffs specifically, not provider-assignees 
generally.  The assignment at issue in CardioNet expressly 
included “all . . . rights (without limitation) under the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 . . . along 
with any other rights under federal or state law that [they] 
may have as related to the reimbursement of coverage for the 
uncovered treatment.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted).  The 
assignments here do not contain such limitless language. 
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without such enforcement capabilities.”).  After all, the 
assignment is only as good as payment if the provider can 
enforce it.  See Conn. State Dental Ass’n v. Anthem Health 
Plans, Inc., 591 F.3d 1337, 1352 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[A]n 
assignment furthers ERISA’s purposes only if the provider 
can enforce the right to payment.”).  Every United States 
Court of Appeals to have considered this question has found, 
as we do, that an assignment of benefits is sufficient to confer 
ERISA standing.  See, e.g., id.; Tango Transp. v. Healthcare 
Fin. Servs. LLC, 322 F.3d 888, 889 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding 
that an assignment of the right to sue the insurer was valid 
where the assignment read, “I hereby assign payment of 
hospital benefits directly to Mississippi Baptist Medical 
Center herein specified and otherwise payable to me”); I.V. 
Servs. of Am. v. Inn Dev. & Mgmt., 182 F.3d 51, 54 n.3 (1st 
Cir. 1999) (holding that an assignment of only the right to 
payment “easily clear[ed]” the low hurdle of a colorable 
claim for derivative standing, and the argument that an 
assignment to receive payment did not include the right to file 
suit “wrongly conflate[d] two distinct inquiries” as to 
standing and scope (quotation marks omitted)); Cromwell v. 
Equicor-Equitable HCA Corp., 944 F.2d 1272, 1275 (6th Cir. 
1991) (suggesting the assignment of all payments due under 
the terms of the contract was sufficient to give the assignee 
derivative standing); Misic v. Bldg. Serv. Emps. Health & 
Welfare Trust, 789 F.2d 1374, 1378-79 (9th Cir. 1986) (per 
curiam) (holding that the assignment of patients’ rights to 
reimbursement gave a provider ERISA standing in their 
place). 
 
 In coming to the same conclusion as our sister circuits, 
we are guided by Congress’s intent that ERISA “protect . . . 
the interests of participants in employee benefit plans,” 29 
U.S.C. § 1001(b), and our conviction that the assignment of 
ERISA claims to providers “serves the interests of patients by 
increasing their access to care.”  CardioNet, 751 F.3d at 179.  
It does not seem that the interests of patients or the intentions 
of Congress would be furthered by drawing a distinction 
between a patient’s assignment of her right to receive 
payment and the medical provider’s ability to sue to enforce 
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that right.5  The value of such assignments lies in the fact that 
providers, confident in their right to reimbursement and 
ability to enforce that right against insurers, can treat patients 
without demanding they prove their ability to pay up front.  
Patients increase their access to healthcare and transfer 
responsibility for litigating unpaid claims to the provider, 
which will ordinarily be better positioned to pursue those 
claims.  See Hermann Hosp. v. MEBA Med. & Benefits Plan, 
845 F.2d 1286, 1289 n.13 (5th Cir. 1988) (“[P]roviders are 
better situated and financed to pursue an action for benefits 
owed for their services.”).  These advantages would be lost if 
an assignment of payment of benefits did not implicitly 
confer standing to sue.  See Conn. State Dental, 591 F.3d at 
1352.  As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit observed, if providers’ “status as assignees does not 
entitle them to federal standing against [insurers], providers 
would either have to rely on the beneficiary to maintain an 
ERISA suit, or they would have to sue the beneficiary.  Either 
alternative . . . would discourage providers from becoming 
assignees and possibly from helping beneficiaries who were 
unable to pay them ‘up-front.’”  Hermann Hosp., 845 F.2d at 
1289 n.13; see also Cagle v. Bruner, 112 F.3d 1510, 1515 
(11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (“If provider-assignees cannot 
sue the ERISA plan for payment, they will bill the participant 
or beneficiary directly for the insured medical bills, and the 
participant or beneficiary will be required to bring suit against 
the benefit plan when claims go unpaid. On the other hand, if 
provider-assignees can sue for payment of benefits, an 
assignment will transfer the burden of bringing suit from plan 
                                              
5 We note that where a provider retains the right to bill the 
patient for unpaid medical fees, interpreting an assignment of 
the right to payment as an assignment of the patient’s § 502 
claim could create a risk that, if the provider sought recourse 
against the patient instead of the insurer, the patient would be 
responsible for the bill for healthcare services but lack a § 502 
remedy against her insurers.  Such a case would require a 
court to determine whether an implied term of the assignment 
is that a provider must make a reasonable effort to collect 
from the insurer before attempting to collect from the patient.  
Of course, that factual scenario is not before us as NJBSC has 
brought its claims against Aetna alone.  We therefore reserve 
that question for a case that requires its resolution. 
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participants and beneficiaries to providers[, who] are better 
situated and financed to pursue an action for benefits owed 
for their services.” (quotation marks and citations omitted)). 
 
 We note, moreover, that reading an assignment of 
benefits to confer standing under § 502(a) advances the public 
interest in uniform interpretation of ERISA.  It is a significant 
advantage for ERISA-plan participants if basic rules 
governing assignments and standing to sue do not change 
when they cross circuit lines.  Cf. Menkes v. Prudential Ins. 
Co. of Am., 762 F.3d 285, 292 (3d Cir. 2014) (joining other 
United States Courts of Appeals in declining to unbundle 
closely related components of an ERISA plan and noting 
ERISA’s goal of “uniform regulation ‘is impossible . . . if 
plans are subject to different legal obligations in different 
States’”); Krishna v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 7 F.3d 11, 16 (2d 
Cir. 1993) (“There is a strong interest in uniform, 
uncomplicated administration of ERISA plans.”).   
 
 Based on the practical concerns described above, 
Congress’s intent to protect plan participants, the interests of 
increasing patients’ access to healthcare, and the interest in 
uniform interpretation of ERISA, we conclude that an 
assignment of the right to payment is sufficient to confer 
standing to sue for payment under ERISA § 502(a)(1).  
 
IV. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District 
Court’s order dated March 6, 2014 and remand this action for 
further proceedings. 
 
